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ABSTRACT 
Applying a form of genealogical method rooted in Nietzsche’s use of history, this article seeks an 
understanding of ‘marking’ punishments in our own mass-mediated culture. First, Foucault’s analysis 
of the punitive tactic of marking in his 1973 course, The Punitive Society, will be considered. Second, 
his concept of ‘virtual marking’ will be extended and applied to the case of the pitture infamante in 
the early renaissance. Third, I will use these insights in a genealogical spirit in order to examine the 
rise of virtual marking in modernity. We will discover that Foucault was mistaken to tether marking 
punishments so closely to sovereign power. Instead, with certain antecedents in ancient Rome, 
virtual marking emerged in a largely bourgeois society during the early renaissance and re-emerges 




Visual criminology, spectacle, culture, punishment, Foucault 
Introduction 
Since 1997, Foucault’s Collège de France lectures have been reconstructed from manuscripts and 
tape recordings and, one by one, issued in published form under the direction of François Ewald and 
Alessandro Fontana. The published series is not yet complete but, so far, it has provided new 
perspectives on his established publications, as well as on the work in progress never published in 
his lifetime. Like all professors at the Collège, Foucault was expected to present original research in 
his public lectures and he used the opportunity not only to explore avenues relevant to his 
publishing projects but also to raise important questions, some of them, at least, as if in an invitation 
to future researchers (Ewald and Fontana 1997/2003: ix–xi). The most recent publication in the 
series is the 1973 course, La Société Punitive, issued in December 2013 (Foucault 2013a).1 Previously, 
only a short course outline has been available (Foucault 1973/2000); the full text of the course 
illuminates and expands the themes and at the same time gives different emphases, an important 
case of which will be examined here.  
Foucault’s described the ‘punitive tactic’ of ‘marking’ in the first lecture of his course and this article 
will explore its wider possibilities to point at a possible history of the present. Because he went on to 
analyse in detail the origins and effects of confinement as the primary punitive tactic of modernity, 
Foucault did not elaborate on marking punishments much further except in the extreme form of the 
‘spectacle of the scaffold’ familiar to us from Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1975/1981) and in 
order rhetorically to make a dramatic contrast to the modern age. Taking up his suggestion that 
marking may be ‘virtual’ as well as ‘actual’, a practice of virtual marking, so far not considered in 
criminology, the case of the pitture infamanti of early renaissance Italy, will be examined. Finally, I 
will suggest that this analysis may contribute to an understanding of our own time, in which an 
image regime of mass-mediated spectacle is prominent in crime, control and punishment.2   
From the outset, we should be aware that Foucault’s writings and lectures throw out a multiplicity of 
insights, understandings and theorisations to the reader, which may discourage those in search of a 
clear, single, unambiguous approach to any one problem (such as knowledge, punishment, power, 
sexuality, government, security, ethics and so forth). In approaching these texts as a theoretical 
frame for this article, Foucault’s own counsel will be followed as it emerged in the course of a joint 
interview with Deleuze in 1972 (Deleuze 1972/2004), where they advise against the attempt to find 
a unitary essence in a text; instead it is more important how texts work in culture and how they are 
used by readers. Emerging from their interview was of a sense of the text in general as having a 
multiplicity of possibilities but, more specifically, that they wanted their own texts to be taken in this 
manner. Of course, this should not be understood as declaring some kind of ‘post-modern’ absence 
of meaning, or interpretive free-for-all; far from it. It is in the nature of good texts, whether in 
literature or among, for example, the sociological ‘greats’, that they are open to interpretation and 
debate. The key issue for Foucault and Deleuze is not to search for the secret code of a text but, 
rather, to see how it works and to make use of it to investigate a problem, respecting its multiple 
possibilities. Hence the purpose of engaging with Foucault as a theoretical frame for this article is 
not to argue for a single, hidden essence in what he intends to say or mean, because that would be 
against a genealogical approach.  
But what do we mean by genealogy? The concept is set up in Foucault’s important, 1971 reading – 
and use – of Nietzsche’s ideas and vocabulary of history, and is operative in his own method 
(Foucault 1983; 1971/1984; Mahon 1992). As a history of the present, it works in the sense of, first, 
how we came to be where we are now – our so-called ‘descent’ from complex historical scenes to 
the present day – and, second, how the phenomenon in question ‘emerged’ and continues to 
‘emerge’.3 Descent will involve a consideration of the body, while emergence is always a political 
process, taking place amid power relations. Genealogy respects the complexity, multiplicity, mobility 
and temporality of things; it avoids taking for granted any ‘essence’ of the matter. In genealogy the 
body plays a central role as ‘the inscribed surface of events’ (Foucault 1971/1984: 83), as well as the 
place of desires and sentiments. Bodies are immanent to history, embedded in social relations, and 
are not products of an underlying biological constant, evolutionary formula or civilising process. 
From a genealogical perspective, bodies, along with all their impulses and affects, are ‘moulded by a 
great many distinct regimes’ (Foucault 1971/1984: 87).  
Using this methodology rooted in Nietzsche’s work, I will deploy Foucault’s analysis of punitive 
tactics to examine the defaming pictures of the early renaissance in a genealogical frame. We will 
discover a punitive tactic directed at the body – a particular kind of painted image of the body – as a 
practice of virtual marking. In what may be regarded as a bourgeois society, this regime of the body 
set in urban space utilised an image economy of fame and infamy where elites involved in commerce 
and banking played a prominent role. Such practices of virtual marking – using the pictorial form of 
photography – emerge again in modernity in a society of mass-mediated spectacle, a new regime of 
the body, at the same time as the punitive tactic of actual marking rapidly declines.  
 
The punitive society 
In a self-consciously schematic and hesitant way, Foucault lays out the ‘four great forms of punitive 
tactic’ in his first lecture (3 January 1973) of the Collège de France course, The Punitive Society 
(Foucault 2013a: 8–14). Preferring to use verbs rather than nouns, he designates the tactics as 
follows: (1) ‘exclude’; (2) ‘organise a redemption [rachat], impose a compensation;’ (3) ‘mark’; (4) 
‘confine’. Before focusing on the punitive tactic of marking, I will first look at the general scheme and 
its genealogical purpose. Foucault hypothesises that there are types of society corresponding to 
each of these punitive tactics but he is aware that there are possible objections since the formula of 
the four tactics is, in many ways, abstract and at a high level of generality. Exclusion is the privileged 
tactic in the punishments of Ancient Greece; marking practices preponderate in Western societies 
from the high Middle Ages until the 18th century; while confinement predominates in our own time.  
In the course summary he completes the set by asserting that compensation corresponds to 
‘Germanic societies’ (Foucault 2000: 23), implying the groups that invaded and settled many parts of 
Europe after the collapse of the western Roman Empire.  
One of the issues he emphasises is the way in which the same punitive action can serve different 
purposes in different social systems. Thus the fine, for example, acts as a form of redemption or 
reparation between two parties in societies of compensation, whereas the way in which it can 
diminish economic status is a trace left by the sovereign in marking societies. Here Foucault’s 
theoretical gesture is based on that of Nietzsche (1887/1996) who, in the Second Essay of On the 
Genealogy of Morals, first differentiates between the act or drama of punishment, on the one hand, 
and its social function, on the other; second, emphasises the relationship of punitive practices to the 
operation of power; and, third, points to the multiplicity of punitive forms (Nietzsche 1996: 57–63). 
Foucault makes his debt to Nietzschean methodology more explicit his 1971 essay ‘Nietzsche, 
genealogy, history’ (Foucault 1971/1984). For Foucault, like Nietzsche, the purpose of punishment 
has less to do with its justification in law and more from the way in which it is embedded in a matrix 
of power relations. We can only understand punitive tactics in the context of how power makes 
them work. Indeed, Foucault’s genealogical intentions are clear. ‘Penality as an analyser [analyseur] 
of power: that is the theme of this course’ (Foucault 2013a: 14). 
At times an impression is given, both in The Punitive Society and in Discipline and Punish, that one 
social form succeeds another: the organisation of power in a monarchical society is replaced by a 
very different organisation of power in a liberal-capitalist society, each with their corresponding 
forms of punishment, marking tactics in the case of the former and confinement measures in the 
case of the latter. Perhaps Foucault is paying his respects to the structural scheme of Rusche and 
Kirchheimer (1939; see Foucault 1975/1981: 24–25) but it is clear from the course summary of The 
Punitive Society (Foucault 2000) that he wishes to introduce a greater degree of hybridity. In the 
‘classical period’ (16th – 18th centuries) he sees all four tactics – exclusion, compensation, marking 
and confinement – mixed together. This view accords with the genealogical spirit of Foucault’s 
endeavours, allowing for a greater heterogeneity and hybridity of both power and punishment. This 
is evident, for example, in Foucault’s analysis of vagabondage in the era of the sovereign marking 
society (Foucault 2013a: 46–53). Though the vagabond may be marked with a brand as an 
expression of sovereign power, there are other dynamics. He does not make it explicit at this stage, 
but it is clear that there are also practices that accord much more with the exclusionary rituals of 
ancient Greek societies in addition to the marking tactic found in the ancien régime. Foucault 
describes how branded vagabonds could be treated like army deserters, exposed to punishment by 
the populace if found in the wrong place, a punishment that could extend to the infliction of death 
with impunity (Foucault 2013a: 52). Thus he anticipates in some way Agamben’s (1995/1998) 
description of the homo sacer, the body excluded from the protections of the political community 
that may be killed with impunity, a modality of punishment seen by Foucault as originating in the 
Ancient Greek societies of exclusion.4 In these practices, there is an articulation of the sovereign 
power of marking, on the one side, with more collective, civic forms of exclusionary punishment, on 
the other. Likewise, Foucault’s description of the way in which the 17th and 18th century French 
practice of the lettre de cachet – a special letter written by families and community representatives 
and addressed to the office of the monarch – may lead to practices of confinement (most clearly laid 
out in his 1973 ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’ lectures delivered in Rio de Janeiro; Foucault 2002)  
betokens more decentred and distributed forms of power coexisting and functioning in the 
microsociological field, and making links to, or making use of, the sovereign centre. Hence there is a 
good deal of plurality and hybridity in the forms of punishment and power, but it is nevertheless 
useful to categorise them for the purposes of analysis, as Foucault does in The Punitive Society. It is 
against this background of Foucault’s four-fold analytic framework of punitive tactics and their 
relations to strategies of power that I will now look in more detail at the visual practice Foucault 
called ‘marking’. 
The marking tactic  
There are two main sources for Foucault’s analysis of the marking tactic. Until the Collège de France 
lectures of 1973 were published in 2013, we relied on the course summary published at the time 
(Foucault 2000). Like his famous Discipline and Punish descriptions of the scaffold spectacle and the 
execution of Damiens, the course summary gives more emphasis to actions involving the actual 
body: ‘expose, mark, wound, amputate, make a scar, leave a sign on the face or the shoulder, 
impose an artificial and visible handicap, torture; in short, seize the body and inscribe on it the marks 
of power’ (Foucault 2000: 23).  The course summary of The Punitive Society may have left some 
room for metaphor in the idea of ‘wounding’ or ‘hurting’ (blesser), but in the full lecture course a 
broader concept of marking becomes more obvious as he emphasises both ‘actual and virtual’ 
marking (Foucault 2013a: 9). The mark, which is also ‘something like a trace’ (Foucault 2013a: 9), 
may be left on the body itself or on the status of the person. Thus it not only includes amputating 
the hand of the thief, for example, but also exposing the face at the pillory. Moreover, if power 
cannot seize the actual body, it may nevertheless mark its reputation, ‘inflict a symbolic stain’ on its 
name, on its character (Foucault 2013a: 9). Memory and recognition are important here: the mark 
amounts to a ‘kind of monument’ to ‘shame and infamy’ (Foucault 2013a: 9). Punitive action does 
not restore relations as in the compensation tactic, where it is possible to ‘forget’ the offence, but is 
a permanent scar that cannot escape memory.  In a dual way, the mark reflects both the offence and 
an imprint of power, in this case, for Foucault, sovereign power.  
Thus ‘actual’ marking refers to physical imprints on the body, while ‘virtual’ marking refers to a mark 
on the image, in the most general sense, of the individual. The exhibition of the body in the pillory, 
for example (leaving aside any action of the crowd on the actual body), is its presentation to the 
visual gaze, which Foucault here calls ‘virtual’ because the ‘mark’ works at the level of reputation, 
status and memory alone. Through the gaze, marking attacks the figure of the person and then 
circulates in the social figuration of status. Departing from the Foucauldian example of the direct 
gaze, we can extend this concept of the virtual to speak of iconic marks on the body of the individual 
in the realm of imagery. Here a mediated gaze of spectators is fixed on an identifiable 
representation of the body, such as in the painted image, for instance, an example I will take up in 
the case below. The stain then becomes symbolic as it shifts from the register of the iconic to affect 
social status and become inscribed in memory.   
By looking more closely at the punitive tactic of marking in its actual and virtual forms, we open up 
different perspectives on what Foucault regarded as the ‘history of bodies’ in Discipline and Punish, 
where, as well as considering the forces of modernity – particularly the body’s ‘constitution as 
labour power’ – he speaks more generally about how, in the political field, various power relations 
may be invested in the body to ‘mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform 
ceremonies, to emit signs’ (Foucault 1975/1981: 25–26). His observations on marking in The Punitive 
Society expand these possibilities, allowing the consideration of a punitive tactic that involves the 
body in a realm of virtual performance and signification.   
Before moving onto an important case of virtual marking, we should note three key points. First, in 
his consideration of the marking tactic, Foucault provides us with a more explicit analysis than was 
available in Discipline and Punish. Second, as we will see later, the linkage between marking and 
sovereignty is not a necessary one, even if it is one that appeared to predominate in Foucault’s 
description of the ancien régime. Finally, the concept of virtual marking is not exhausted by the 
indications given by Foucault. I will now turn to an instance of virtual marking: the pitture infamanti 
of the early renaissance.5 
Virtual marking in the renaissance image 
Public images exercise power, particularly when they depict the body. Spectators respond to and 
participate in this potency, whether it is conceived as divine, magical, erotic, political or, indeed, 
punitive (Freedberg 1989). Perhaps the most famous example of a use of the image in punishment is 
the executio in effigie where, in the late mediaeval and early modern periods, painted images or 
sculpted effigies were occasionally subject to punishment, whether through hanging, decapitation, 
burning, or other means. (Rebecchini 2013; Freedberg 1989: 246, 262). In some ways this was not 
unlike a practice of the ancient Romans, which we have come to call damnatio memoriae, an 
attempt after death to destroy the repute of persons (particularly Roman emperors, it seems) 
through, among other actions, doing violence to their sculpted and painted images, a practice which, 
from time to time, would later occasionally be visited on particularly unpopular Popes (Rebecchini 
2013), and is also familiar in our own time in the destruction of statues, for example after the fall of 
the Soviet regime or following the invasion of Iraq. 
More prevalent in the renaissance than these executio and damnatio practices were the pitture 
infamanti, defamatory portraits or portraits of the infamous, which arose as an officially approved 
practice within a legal framework. Drawing on Ortalli’s (1979) study, Freedberg (1989) describes how 
these portraits, painted on the exterior of public buildings, appeared first in Parma in the mid-13th 
century and spread rapidly to at least 12 city states (or commune) in northern and central Italy by 
the end of the century, and eventually to some 27 cities in total. The use of defamatory images 
elsewhere in Europe has been little researched but there is evidence that they were used in 
Germany, Poland and Bohemia from the last two decades of the 14th century until the 16th century 
(Lentz 2000).6,7 
In the context of the early renaissance revival of ancient Roman law, Edgerton (1985) describes the 
use in Italy of the principles of fama and infamia. Fama represented the good name, the reliable 
reputation of a citizen, designating, for example, the validity of testimony in the courts or honour in 
entering a contract. Infamia designated one who possessed a bad name, a person whose word could 
not be trusted. Persons in possession of infamia were also liable to torture in judicial proceedings 
because their honour was not sufficient to guard against untrue testimony (Peters 1985: 18–44; 
Foucault 1979: 36–42). Thus, when subject to a sanction of this kind, the criminal would become 
infamia, deprived of fama, and it was on this principle that a punitive image – as lifelike as possible – 
could also be depicted in public places. Here, via the revival of Roman law, politics and art, we can 
also trace a genealogical descent from the ancient Roman practices of image violence, where the 
good reputation of a person was destroyed after death. 
13th century Parma saw its earliest form, where the image of the criminal was painted on the wall of 
the town hall together with the name and the charge. Always applied to men and not women, and 
men of high status rather than low status, this kind of image punishment was directed at those who 
had been found guilty of political crimes in betrayal of the city, or those who had committed 
financial offences, such as fraudulent bankruptcy or embezzlement, though the offences varied from 
one city to the next (Ortalli 1979; Freedberg 1989). The punishment was most often applied to those 
who had escaped the city in contempt of court. 
In the setting of the republican city state of this period, the public spectacle of bodily punishment 
took both actual and virtual forms. Just as the realistic naturalism of defaming images could draw 
upon the spectacle of marketplace punishments, so the religious iconography of punishment (such 
as found in Last Judgement depictions) was taken from a fund of actual marking punitive tactics, 
corporal and capital, practised at the time (Merback 1999). The links between punishment and its 
image could also be made by their spatial proximity. For example, in Florence, public hangings could 
take the form of suspension from the windows of the Palazzo del Podestà (the building of the 
magistrate, criminal courts, and cells for the condemned, later known as the Bargello) on whose 
walls would also be found defaming frescoes (Edgerton 1985: 50). Clearly the more realistic the 
images were, the better, not only to engage viewers with a greater sense of immediacy but also to 
remind them of actual ceremonies of corporal humiliation in other public punishments.  
Sullying an image of the coat of arms was not an uncommon feature of the pitture infamanti, as well 
as in the images at the heart of Lenz’s (2000) study, which also found the use of defaming images 
among high-status persons. Contracts of all kinds were concluded in these thriving commercial 
communities and they required the honour of the parties, usually marked by a seal bearing the 
family coat of arms. Breaking contracts could result in image-punishment. Not uncommon, alongside 
the portrait of the defaulter, was a depiction of a coat of arms upside down or covered in excrement 
thus casting a further dishonouring mark on the defaulter, whose capacity to enter into future 
contracts – at least in the urban community where the pictorial punishment had taken place – was 
more or less permanently damaged. Among the most ignominious of pictorial punishments was a 
portrayal of the offending person hanging upside-down by the left foot, an image familiar from the 
Tarot deck and Last Judgement images (Edgerton 1985: 87–88) and first used as a pittura infamante 
in 1347 in Rome (which rarely saw such defaming pictures according to the study of Ortalli 1979, 
even if it was known for the executio in effigie). In northern Europe, defamatory depictions of the 
offending person broken on the wheel were also used (Lenz 2000: 155). 
Figure 1. 
Andrea del Sarto (1530), drawing of two men hanging upside down (Devonshire Collection, 
Chatsworth). 
The politics of virtual marking 
We should ask the genealogical question: in what social and political contexts did these defaming 
images emerge? Calling them ‘frescoes of obloquy’, the 19th century cultural historian, Jacob 
Burckhardt (2005: 157–60), observed that they were features of many newly-established Italian city 
republics and, according to Edgerton (1985: 59), ‘the commissioning of the pitture infamanti 
provided one of the earliest models for state patronage of the arts at the dawn of the renaissance’.  
Successfully resisting the power of the Holy Roman Empire and the church, and having tamed the 
feudal aristocracy, these city states were more or less autonomous, republican and governed by an 
early form of democracy in which a ‘burgher’ class played a prominent role in the political order 
known as the commune (Wieruszowski 1944). Accordingly, the art and architecture in these city 
states placed a significant emphasis on the use of public buildings and public space, together with 
realistic forms of pictorial depiction, a modelling of the body in three dimensions with a more 
naturalistic use of space, light, shade and colour (White 1987; Hills 1987). In the realm of the painted 
image, these processes would culminate in the well-known flowering of geometric, linear 
perspective at the beginning of the 15th century (Baxandall 1988), itself based on investigations of 
the astonishingly naturalistic effects of the camera obscura. The urban form and the nature of its life 
created large audiences for public ritual and art. In this republican setting, ‘fame’, if it was not 
bestowed by aristocratic lineage, was earned among peers in public institutions through its 
performance. The presentation of the figure seeking fame in such settings led to a new honorific art 
of naturalistic portraiture (Baxandall 1988; Rubin 2007). Such realistic and recognisable portraiture 
was influenced by the naturalism of ancient Roman sculpture, collected and studied by the 
humanists of the time; but the idea of renaissance, or a rebirth of Roman culture, also found its way 
into legal forms, as we have seen. Hence the art of portraiture and the concern with fama were 
fundamentally linked through the revival of Roman law and culture. Thus, in the art of infamia, we 
see the same concern for realism and recognition, and a cross-over of artists who had also painted 
honorific portraiture. Freedberg (1989) notes that, at certain times and in certain places, the 
shaming force of the defaming portrait might rub off onto the artist. But at other times, as in the 
case of Botticelli in Florence, there was no such concern (Edgerton 1985). 
Given the republican-democratic political structures, the economy of commerce, industry and 
banking (all with considerable surpluses), and the central role of the image in social life, it is arguable 
that the northern and central Italian commune was one off the earliest ‘bourgeois’ societies of 
spectacle. In the context of this civic spectacle, Wieruszowski (1944) has argued that, even in 
religious pictures, the municipal commune commissioned a form of ‘political art’ bearing the 
iconography of well-known historical events important to the city, as well as recognisable portraits 
of notables. As expressions of municipal justice, defamatory pictures displayed in public space were 
a natural extension of this ‘politico-didactic tendency’ (Wieruszowski 1944: 21). They could also 
become instruments of pure political conflict (Wieruszowski 1944: 22) as Edgerton (1985) shows in 
the case of their late manifestation in 16th century Florence.  
Though the art of the time also sought new ways of religious expression, Wieruszowski finds in its 
humanisation of themes and exploration of naturalism an effect that brought the image closer to the 
spectator, a trend for which she uses the term verbürgerlichung, thus implying a movement to what 
might be called a more ‘bourgeois’ culture of seeing (Wieruszowski 1944: 28). Though the presence 
of identifying words and symbols were useful in these portraits, physical resemblance was regarded 
as important. Portrayals of the defamed person would be so convincing that their image was given 
to spectators as ‘a present and distinctive body’ (Freedberg 1989: 254) depicted in a ‘tactile and 
tangible’ manner (Lentz 2000: 160). We know from the records of the paintings, as well as surviving, 
analogous depictions of Last Judgement punishments and the trauma of battles, that a cruel 
naturalism – keen on realistic, bodily details – was used in attaching the spectator to the forces of 
the pittura infamante (Wieruszowski 1944: 29). In this way we see both a visual and affective 
engagement of the spectator’s body. 
Edgerton (1985) argues that the decline of the pitture infamanti took place as a result of 
transformations of aesthetic taste and religious sensibility. In the art of Bronzino, for example, the 
mannerist painting of the 16th century focused on the beauty of surface effects more than it did on 
moral meaning. However, there is another way of looking at this decline in the light of Foucault’s 
understanding of punitive tactics. Elsewhere in northern and central Italy, the use of the pitture 
rapidly declined in the 15th century some time before the rise of mannerism as an aesthetic 
movement. A more plausible explanation – and in the spirit of Foucault’s genealogical analysis – is a 
change in an important component of the matrix of power relations when republican forms of rule 
were replaced by an aristocratic monarchy that would eventually lead to the emergence of 
absolutism in the 17th century. The practice persisted in Florence (the subject of Edgerton’s study) in 
the context of violent, political battles between the advocates of republican and aristocratic rule 
(Edgerton 1985). Mannerism was a feature of the courtly form of painting that developed in 
Florence in the 16th century as republicanism declined, but it was the cultural symptom of a change 
in power relations rather the cause. 
With this analysis of virtual marking and its political contexts in mind, I will now turn, in a 
genealogical spirit, to a consideration of how the case of virtual marking we have just considered 
permits another kind of visual criminological analysis of the spectacle of crime and punishment in 
our own day. 
Virtual marking and modern spectacle 
Reflecting on the deaths of Timothy McVeigh and Juan Raul Garza in the early years of this century, 
the first US federal executions since 1963, Conquergood (2002) found Foucault’s evocations of the 
spectacle of the ancien regime scaffold more resonant than his sober descriptions of modern 
penitentiary punishment. There were certain continuities between the dramaturgy of execution in 
our own age and the spectacle of the scaffold described by Foucault. Seeing ‘a theatre of retribution 
and revenge’ (Conquergood 2002: 359), he observed that the hunger for punitive spectacle had 
been evident in a gubernatorial campaign of the time, when images of the San Quentin gas chamber 
were used in TV commercials. But the possibilities of punitive spectacle in the present day are not 
limited to execution, as Brown’s (2009) study of the spectacular dimensions of imprisonment has 
shown. Whereas Conquergood saw this desire for punitive theatre as symptomatic of a major shift in 
social attitudes to punishment since the mid-1970s, others have noticed a longer duration in modern 
punitive spectacle. Notwithstanding important debates over whether there has been a broader 
punitive turn in the last four decades, 8 it is quite possible to argue that crime and punishment was 
already caught up in a modern society of spectacle originating in the 19th century.  
Arriving in 1839, photography’s early years saw its use as a technology to record the faces of 
convicts (Finn 2009). In this context and in both Britain and France the punitive possibilities of the 
photograph were discussed (Carney 2010). Moreau-Christophe, the French Inspector-General of 
Prisons, argued in 1854 for the more general and systematic use of the photograph in criminal 
identification but also its possibilities in punitive spectacle. Writing in La Lumière (the first French 
periodical solely devoted to photography), he declared that the systems of criminal identification 
would be improved through ‘inflicting this new mark’ (Phéline 1985: 53). In France the branding iron 
for convicts had been abolished in 1832 and, by means of this telling comparison, M. Moreau-
Christophe brought together, first, a mode of marking punishment and, second, a technology of 
identification. The comparison with the branding iron was also made in Britain where, as late as the 
1860s, the letters B.C. were marked on the skin of army offenders of ‘bad character’ (Jay 1991: 110). 
In 1868 The Photographic News (16th October) argued that ‘a photographic portrait would be more 
humane and marginally less degrading’ while, in a less sanguine manner, The Daily News (3rd 
February, 1871) condemned the new ‘torture by photography’ (quoted by Jay 1991: 111). Such 
concerns were aired amid the rise of modern forms of actual and virtual spectatorship.  
The form and content of late 19th century newspapers reflected a new attention to the spectacles of 
the city as well as to sensational events, including political scandal, war, disaster and, of course, 
crime and punishment. At the same time there was a brisk trade in crime photographs leaking out 
from the offices of police photographers, as Parry’s (2000) study of Paris in the late 19th century has 
shown. In this regard, the virtual spectacles in newspapers and in circulating photographs were 
continuous with the actual spectacles of the city both in the everyday and in the extraordinary 
(Schwartz 1998). Such a spectatorial stance was evident in popular fictional literature and factual 
accounts relaying stories of sensational crime (Leps 1992). Photography and the mass media ensured 
that punitive spectacle did not abate in the transition to modernity. Writing in the 1960s, Erikson 
observed that the historical transformations leading to the decline of public punishments in the late 
18th and early 19th century ‘coincided almost exactly with the development of newspapers as a 
medium of mass information’. They continue to ‘offer much the same kind of entertainment as 
public hangings on a Sunday or a visit to the local gaol.’ (Erikson 1966: 11-12). Looking back on the 
rise of the 19th century mass media and linking it in the same way to the present, Canetti, whose 
work in 1960 also recalled the inter-war period of the 20th century, observed in his analysis of the 
‘baiting crowd’ that ‘everybody takes part in public executions through the newspapers. […] The 
baiting crowd is preserved in the newspaper reading public’. If this ‘crowd’ of virtual spectators is 
less forceful, it is also more irresponsible and much more stable since it neither needs to assemble 
for the event nor disperse afterwards. In the modern media spectacle, the crowd is in attendance all 
the time (Canetti 1992: 59–60). Whether it was in the context of a cultural shift in sensibilities or a 
reconfiguration of power relations or, more likely, a combination of both (Garland 2009), the new 
forms of virtual, spectacular mass media either supplemented or replaced the actual spectacles of 
punitive ritual from the previous age.  
Similar kinds of observation have been made in the case of the video screen. Mathiesen (1997: 215–
234) echoes Canetti’s argument by speaking of ‘the executions (real or metaphoric) on the screens 
of modern television’. Against Foucault, he finds that punishment, far from being the most hidden 
part of the penal process, becomes conspicuous in what he calls the ‘synopticon’. Indeed, he feels 
that the 1757 execution of the would-be regicide, Damiens, with which Foucault (1975/1981) 
famously opens Discipline and Punish, is but little compared to what we see today in the synopticon. 
He argues that the isomorphism of certain panoptic and synoptic technologies is evidence for 
similarity in modes of power. Foucault (1975/1981:203) had already noted the architectural 
correspondence between Bentham’s panopticon and the earlier menagerie of Le Vaux at Versailles 
with a central, octagonal observatory from which the king could see the surrounding cages,  or the 
contemporary panorama of Barker (again a central tower opening onto a painted simulation of a 
land, sea or cityscape, with or without an historical event such as a battle) in which the paying 
spectators occupied ‘the place of the sovereign gaze’ (ibid. p. 317). Bentham anticipated admitting 
the public to the observation tower of the panopticon thus representing the whole of society 
observing its deviants, acting to survey and supervise.  Hence the very structure of the panopticon 
also permitted spectatorship, and in our own age camera and screen are turned to both surveillance 
and spectacle (Mathiesen 1997), mediated by the greater intensity and extent of photographic force 
in our mass media (Carney 2010). 
Canetti’s understanding of the modern ‘crowd’ as the audience of a mass-media spectacle looked 
back on a period when it was also possible for ordinary soldiers in Nazi death squads to capture 
trophy images and circulate them informally (Morrison 2004). In a different setting, where modes of 
punitive spectacle were still directed at the actual body in the public torture lynchings of the 
southern United States (Toinay and Beck 1992; Garland 2005) forms of virtual marking coexisted. A 
form of modern spectatorship commemorated these lynchings in postcards and other kinds of 
circulating photograph (Allen et al 2000). Such practices were found again in the Abu Ghraib images 
of torture in which performances for the camera and a wider audience were anticipated (Hamm 
2007; Carrabine 2011). For Sontag (1979), the practice of photography always had the potential for a 
violent, predatory practice. It is possible to trace the emergence of new examples of photographic 
predation in the phenomenon of the paparazzi and in certain cultural forms at the turn of the 1950s 
to the 1960s as post WW2 consumer culture expanded (Carney 2012). In his conceptualisation of 
‘decivilising’ punishment in recent times, Pratt (2000) described spectacular aspects, among which, 
for example, we can find practices from ‘naming and shaming’ to the use of ‘jail cam’, opening up 
the inside of an Arizona prison to the public gaze (Lynch 2004). Most recently the photographic 
medium has revived an almost Lombrosian use of the photographic image, creating stigmatised 
categories of the underclass in a punitive spectacle of ‘meth’ (methamphetamine) users (Linneman 
and Wall 2013). Hence there is an argument that a line of continuity – of genealogical ‘descent’ – 
links the rise of the modern mass media in the first half of the 19th century, through the ‘yellow 
press’ of the late 19th century to our own present, and along this line, with an older source, the 
punitive tactic of visual marking has been an ever-present force. 
Addressing this longer duration of photographic power, ethical dilemmas about the spectatorial 
position and its potential in different contexts to construct empathy, fear, horror, fascination and 
indifference (Carrabine 2012), betoken the intensity of forces in circulating images and the problems 
they present to criminological analysis. Hence the question of the power to punish or torture 
through the photograph raises issues about the ethical stance of the spectator. Quoting Levi-Strauss 
(2003: 8), Carrabine (2012) sees the key ethical question as: ‘what right have I to represent you?’ To 
pose such a question in ethical terms is also to raise the problem of the complex power relations 
between the subject of the photograph, the agent that takes and displays the photograph, and the 
spectating audience. We have here an interaction between bodies, affects and forces: the bodies 
and affects of spectators and spectated; the forces of the circulating photograph. Thus in ethical and 
political terms, we engage with these images not just at a cognitive level but also at the affective 
level (Young 2014), and, in addition to attaching spectators to the ‘scene of the crime’ (Young 2010), 
they attach them to the bodies of criminals in a virtual spectacle of visual, punitive marking.  
Conclusions: The punitive tactic of marking as a history of the present 
There are three stages in the argument of this article. First, based on his 1973 course, The Punitive 
Society, I have given an explication and analysis of Foucault’s presentation of the ‘marking’ punitive 
tactic in order to highlight the ‘virtual’ aspect of marking. Second, a form of virtual marking hitherto 
unexamined in criminology, the case of the pitture infamanti – the defaming, public portraits in 
visual regimes of the early renaissance period – has been analysed. Finally, in a genealogical spirit, I 
propose that the tactic of virtual marking should be considered in our own spectacle of the mass 
media. Foucault’s perspectives on punishment and genealogy have formed the theoretical frame. 
Drawing on Nietzsche’s work, Foucault’s method is genealogical in its understanding of punitive 
practices in terms of power relations and analysing them as a multiplicity rather than as a unity. 
Genealogical method also considers the use to which the traces of historical phenomena may be put 
in order to elaborate an understanding of our own time, or, in Foucault’s terms, a ‘history of the 
present’.  It is a method that has informed this article, in the approach both to analysing Foucault’s 
own texts and to examining the case of the pitture infamanti. 
In what way may we use the pitture infamanti as a history of the present, as a contribution to the 
genealogical analysis of the modern spectacle of punishment? If we understand them as a punitive 
tactic of virtual, visual marking, we learn from studies of the early Italian renaissance (with 
indications of the same phenomenon in contemporary Germany, Bohemia and Poland) that they 
were used among a ruling class of burghers or what we may call an early ‘bourgeoisie’. Undoubtedly, 
such marking could also be used as an expression of sovereign power, but in these cases the power 
was the more ‘communal’ expression of a new class of merchants in alliance with an old class of 
aristocrats who ‘bought into’ (literally as well as metaphorically) the political and economic milieu of 
a commercial and financial urban regime. As a spectacle, such virtual marking-punishment depended 
on engaging the populace as spectators in front of a realistic image of the body. The bodies of 
viewers were thus immediately pulled into the image in a tangible, affective manner. In this way, the 
naturalistic aesthetics of light, space and three-dimensional modelling of the body that we associate 
with the so-called ‘high art’ of the renaissance were also turned to spectacular punitive practices. At 
one and the same time they (i) directly defamed a person, (ii) represented a process of defamation 
and (iii) represented their defamed status. In this respect the images were both performative and 
representational, and depicted the body in order to facilitate memory and recognition. Such imagery 
was also inserted into a cultural circuit of the actual and the virtual in spectacular performance, a 
circuit of forces travelling through three relays: actual public punishments, the Last Judgement 
punishments found in church frescoes and panel paintings, and the pitture infamanti. Thus we see a 
lineage linking one society of spectacle to another, the ‘bourgeois’ societies of the early renaissance, 
representing historical vacuoles that temporarily held sovereign power at arm’s length, and our own 
society of spectacle in a commercial and financial society, in which the circulating photograph 
recruits mass audiences, acting as a vector of performances and representations of a punitive power 
that ‘marks’ the body and serves as a vehicle for memory and recognition.  Sekula’s study of 19th 
century archive photographs (Sekula 1986; see also Carrabine 2014), demonstrated ‘honorific’ and 
‘repressive’ representational forms: those depicting the elevated status of the sitter (such as in 
studio portraiture) and those representing the repressed status of the subject (such as found in the 
institutional photography of criminals and the mentally ill). There is a clear echo of the renaissance 
case considered here, where portraits of infamy circulated in an economy of the image in contrast to 
pictures of fame. Sekula sees these images in cognitive terms as constructing the self-image of 
middle-class portraiture opposing itself to the exemplary, othering images of the repressed classes.  
But the case of the pitture infamanti allows us to discern another dynamic involving the 
performative force of the image, which not only serves to depict a cognitive contrast but is also part 
of social processes that enact the spectacular production of honour and repression.  The renaissance 
example shows how this process may also be an intra-class phenomenon; indeed it is a punitive 
image that can be used to bring down the most elevated of persons. It is in this way that Sekula’s 
account of the honorific and repressive functions of portraiture should be supplemented with an 
account of how the photographic image may have an explicitly punitive power in our own age. With 
this perspective we return to Foucault’s genealogical method where the body plays a central role as 
‘the inscribed surface of events’ (Foucault 1971/1984: 83). Circulating in spectacle, the punitive 
photograph is thus a scene and means of bodily inscription, a tactic of virtual marking.  
Work on the theory of punishment in our own age has in fact suggested a mixture of punitive tactics. 
Thus, for example, exclusionary punishments have been inserted into the practices of sovereign 
violence (Krasmann 2007), while forms of compensation, particularly the fine, are as important as 
confinement and betoken non-disciplinary or post-disciplinary modes of power (O’Malley 2009). In 
short, Foucault’s apparent lock-step correlation of a particular society with a specific form of 
punishment should only be regarded as an initial analytic gesture. His theoretical purpose is to 
outline the relation of forms of punishment to particular, ‘typical’ societies, and therefore link them 
to different kinds of power relation. In reality there will be both multiplicity and hybridity of power 
relations and punitive forms in any one society. This reconfiguration of Foucault’s approach 
reinforces the views of those who have argued that it may be less important to speculate on 
punishment as a whole in any one society and, instead, analyse how punishment breaks down into 
heterogeneous practices (O’Malley 1999; Matthews 2005) as well as, in a genealogical spirit, 
carefully differentiate between intentions, attitudes and practices (Matthews 2014: 117--37). 
Following Foucault’s four-fold analysis of punitive tactics, it is suggested, therefore, that work on 
degrees and kinds of punishment in our own time should seek to analyse them in terms of different 
punitive tactics and their linkages to the operation of power. The argument of this paper is also 
intended to encourage that kind of perspective. 
We could say Foucault may have been prone at times to confusion, error, indecision, self-
contradiction and rhetorical excess, and no doubt many other faults, but it is better to make 
constructive use of his prodigious thinking by looking at both the published output and the Collège 
de France courses as ideas in development and tools of analysis. Basically, he allows for – even if he 
never fully elaborates – the possibility of both a multiplicity of power relations and a multiplicity of 
punishments in any one era. This is compatible with a Nietzschean genealogical perspective. What 
Foucault does, in this genealogical way, is to allow for multiplicity; but also, analytically, he identifies 
the four, great, punitive tactics understood in the context of a specific array of power relations. 
Using Foucault, what this article does is to show the following. If Foucault envisaged the marking 
tactic in a privileged relationship to the power relations of sovereignty, then he was mistaken. We 
have seen that the marking tactic was used in what might be called a more ‘bourgeois’ kind of 
society, with a number of features not dissimilar to our own, in which sovereign power was kept at 
bay. The forms of punishment in general, such as the scaffold, the pillory and so forth, were familiar 
and were implemented by, and expressions of, sovereign power in many other parts of Europe. But 
in these Italian city states of this period they could be operated by another configuration of power, 
the power of a kind of ‘bourgeois’ elite in a society of spectacle using a particular cultural economy 
of fama and infamia both at the level of law and at the level of aesthetic production. One form of 
marking, the form of virtual marking we have examined here, the pitture infamanti, rose and fell 
with these forms of republican commune. But, if this punitive tactic disappeared, it is arguable that it 
would arise in another form, with different aesthetics and different power dynamics, in our own kind 
of society of spectacle. Hence, we can also assert that Foucault was mistaken on a second issue 
when he ignored the rise of a new form of virtual punitive marking in modernity even as the old 
forms of actual punitive marking rapidly declined. But it is also arguable, in both his publications and 
his courses, that he gave us the tools, the genealogical perspective, the analysis of power and the 
classification of punitive tactics that enable us, now, to make this critical judgement. 
Notes  
1. La Société Punitive has not yet been translated into English: all translations from this text are my 
own. References to other Foucault texts will be to the English translations. It is interesting that the 
last texts of the Collège de France course to be transcribed and published in French are those that 
deal with crime and punishment. The last remaining unpublished course is ‘Penal Theories and 
Institutions’ from 1972. 
2. The phrase ‘society of spectacle’ was first used in 1967 in the Situationist analysis of Debord 
(1994). The terms ‘spectacle’ and ‘society of spectacle’ are used here in a broader, descriptive sense 
as found in Carney (2010) without any necessary connection to the Debordian theoretical 
framework. 
3. Foucault (1971/1984) extracts and shapes the concepts ‘descent’ (Herkunft) and ‘emergence’ 
(Enstehung) from a review of a number of Nietzsche’s works. 
4. Indeed the editor of this volume, Bernard Harcourt, remarks on the links between Foucault’s 
description of ancient Greek punishment and Agamben’s theorisation of the homo sacer (Foucault 
2013a: 12, 21; Agamben 1998). In the previous year’s lectures, ‘Lectures on the Will to Know’, his 
first course at the Collège de France in 1970–71, Foucault touched on the social context of 
exclusionary punishments in ancient Greece (Foucault 2011/2013b: 179–81). 
5. Here the term ‘renaissance’ will follow Edgerton’s (1985) usage. 
6. Lentz’s (2000) study focuses on defamatory letters and images in Germany in the 14th and 15th 
centuries, which bear many similarities to the pittture infamanti. Though I will focus mainly on the 
pitture, I will refer to Lenz’s study when relevant. It is arguable that certain features of the Italian city 
states were also present in the political communities examined in Lentz’s research. 
7. Painted on the exterior of public buildings and therefore subject to the degradations of weather 
and political change, no pitture infamanti have survived. Our knowledge of them comes from 
detailed written record in the archives, though 16th century preparatory sketches by Andrea del 
Sarto are available (see Fig. 1). Other forms of defaming portraiture have endured in a small number 
panel paintings and frescoes in churches, and in the few images of Lenz’s (2000) research. 
8. See, for example, Pratt et al. (2005) and Matthews (2005; 2014: 117–37).  
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